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Secure quantum key distribution with multimode Gaussian entangled states and multimode homo-
dyne detectors is proposed. In general the multimode character of both the sources of entanglement
and the homodyne detectors can cause a security break even for a perfect channel when trusted
parties are unaware of the detection structure. Taking into account the multimode structure and
potential leakage of information from a homodyne detector reduces the loss of security to some
extent. We suggest the symmetrization of the multimode sources of entanglement as an efficient
method allowing us to fully recover the security irrespectively to multimode structure of the ho-
modyne detectors. Further, we demonstrate that by increasing the number of the fluctuating but
similar source modes the multimode protocol stabilizes the security of the quantum key distribu-
tion. The result opens the pathway towards quantum key distribution with multimode sources and
detectors.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum physics, as fundamental physical theory, has
many times demonstrated its power as a very efficient
tool to describe and predict behavior of simple quantum
systems. Pioneering development of quantum optics de-
scribing both particle and wave quantum phenomena of
few individual photons or couple of optical modes com-
bined with modern quantum information theory changed
the view on quantum physics during the last two decades
[1, 2]. A joint venture of these fields has produced a very
interesting application of the quantum key distribution
(QKD), where security is guaranteed by the laws of quan-
tum physics [3, 4]. Beyond the practical interest, the
QKD brings also an operational view on many notions of
quantum physics of simple systems, such as quantum su-
perposition, quantum correlations, quantum nonlocality
[5].
Originally, the concept of quantum key distribution
was initiated from two very different points, the Bennett-
Brassard (BB84) protocol exploiting the superpositions
of the single-photon states [6] and the Ekert proto-
col [7] based on the Bell-type quantum correlations be-
tween two photons [8]. Recently, two orthogonal direc-
tions of quantum key distribution have expanded shifting
these original protocols into even more extreme positions.
The Ekert protocol has been developed into the device-
independent form of the QKD [9, 10]. On the other hand,
the BB84 protocol has been translated to the semiclassi-
cal QKD scenario. It uses only continuous-variable (CV)
squeezed [11, 12] and even coherent [13–15] states and
homodyne detectors so that explicit particle properties
of quantum states are not required to provide security.
The semiclassical nature of light still surprisingly allows
transmission of secure key rate for the large distances
[16]. Advantageously, the noise on the trusted sides is
tolerable, allowing CV QKD with the noisy homodyne
detection [17] and even with the thermal states [18–21].
Recently, the entanglement-based CV QKD with homo-
dyne detection overcoming limits of the coherent state
CV QKD [22] has been experimentally verified [23]. The
Gaussian entanglement used in this advanced protocol is
semiclassical since it still admits a local hidden variable
model based on positive Wigner functions [24]. However,
it provides quite robust security for a large distance.
One important and principal aspect of CV QKD has
been always omitted: quantum states and homodyne de-
tectors can be generally multimode [25–30]. The single
mode approximation is therefore only a very strict as-
sumption used in all the security analysis of continuous-
variable QKD and an impact on the multimode structure
on the security of CV QKD has not been analyzed yet,
although it was studied for discrete-variable QKD [31].
In addition, the recently generated bright and heavily
multimode entangled beams [32–37] could have a poten-
tial to be positively used in the semiclassical CV QKD to
improve or stabilize its security. It is also suggested by
their recent successful use in quantum imaging [38–40].
In this paper, we propose the multimode CV QKD tak-
ing fully into account the intrinsic multimode structure
of sources, channels, and detectors. We study in detail
the impact of such structure on security of CV QKD in
the cases when trusted parties are aware or unaware of
it. We observe the generally negative effect of multimode
structure on CV QKD in combination with imperfections
of a multimode channel. We therefore suggest methods
to improve multimode CV QKD by proper mode selec-
tion at the detection stage and by balancing the source,
2which can fully recover the security of the single-mode
scenario. Finally, we show the surprisingly positive effect
of the increasing number of modes on the security of the
multimode CV QKD protocol.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sec. II we de-
scribe the multimode homodyne detection, introduce the
multimode CV QKD protocol, and state the assumptions
being followed, then in Sec. III we analyze the security
limitations of the protocol imposed by the multimode de-
tection structure. After that in Sec. IV we describe the
possible methods to improve the security of the proto-
col, including the knowledge of detection structure, mode
balancing in the detection, mode symmetrization in the
source, key rate stabilization in the case of fluctuating
modes, and then finish the paper with the concluding
remarks.
II. MULTIMODE PROTOCOL
In our work we consider the entanglement-based Gaus-
sian CV QKD protocol, where data are obtained by
the trusted parties from the homodyne measurement of
the Gaussian distributed continuous variables, namely
quadratures of the electromagnetic field. Unlike the tra-
ditional approach, when the sources and the detectors
are assumed to be single mode, we take into account
the possible multimode structure of the homodyne de-
tection. To model a multimode extension of the ho-
modyne detector we consider a local oscillator consist-
ing of N independent principally distinguishable orthog-
onal modes with strong classical amplitudes |αi| exp(iθ),
i = 1, . . . , N and identical phase θ. We suppose that two
intensity detectors forming the homodyne detector are
not able to distinguish the modes and therefore, the ideal
balanced homodyne detection (with unit efficiency and
no electronic noise) will produce a photocurrent i
(N)
− =∑N
i=1 |giαi|X˜i(θ), where X˜i(θ) = ai exp(iθ)+a†i exp(−iθ)
is the quadrature operator of a single mode i, gi are elec-
tronic gains of the detector for individual modes, and
[ai, a
†
j] = δij . We use homodyne gains Gi = |giαi| to
simplify the notation. If the input of homodyne detec-
tor is blocked, the detector measures the N -mode vac-
uum state with variance V
(N)
0 =
∑N
i=1G
2
i . A standard
approach in the CV experiments is to normalize Gi by√
V
(N)
0 to obtain the joint quadrature
X(N)(θ) =
∑N
i=1GiX˜i(θ)√∑N
n=1G
2
n
(1)
of the multimode light. The normalized coefficients
λi = Gi/
√∑N
n=1G
2
n satisfy
∑N
i=1 λ
2
i = 1. We can there-
fore equivalently model any multimode homodyne detec-
tor as a linear optical network placed before the stan-
dard single-mode homodyne detector. This approach
has been used in quantum optics to describe the mul-
timode homodyne for measurement of the internal corre-
lations of optical pulses [41–43]. The other unmeasured
modes of that linear optical network are lost in the de-
tector; they principally can either leave homodyne detec-
tion (untrusted detector) or they are protected against
any external access (trusted detector). The generic case
is depicted in Fig. 1. If Gi = G, the detection of all
the modes is balanced, the N-mode vacuum has vari-
ance V
(N)
0 = NG
2 and joint normalized quadrature sim-
ply becomes X(N)(θ) =
∑
N
i=1
X˜i(θ)√
N
, corresponding to the
symmetrical linear network before the single-mode ho-
modyne.
Now let us consider the protocol based on the multi-
mode homodyne detection and the generally multimode
entangled states. The generic scheme of the multimode
protocol is depicted in Fig. 1, where generally multi-
mode entangled beams are measured by multimode ho-
modyne detectors, modeled as single-mode homodyne de-
tectors (H) precessed by linear-optical coupling of modes
(LOC) and resulting in the outcomes of the form (1).
The Gaussian distributed quadrature entangled multi-
mode states produced by the source are defined by the
variances V1 . . . VN in each of the N measured modes. In
this case, when a source does not emit in a particular i-th
mode the variance of the respective vacuum state is thus
Vi = 1. Alternatively, when the source is multimode,
it can be seen as a set of individual sources producing
twin-beam states [44] in the respective modes. The emit-
ted modes are then measured by a multimode homodyne
detector in one of the beams (A) at the sender trusted
side (Alice). Another multimode beam travels through
an untrusted channel, which is assumed to be fully con-
trolled by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). The channel
is parametrized by transmittance T and excess noise ǫ,
which are assumed to be the same in all the modes (i.e.,
channel is mode insensitive). In practice this may not be
always true (especially in the presence of chromatic dis-
persion and when the modes are detected in the long fre-
quency range) but consideration of mode-sensitive chan-
nels will be the subject of future work. The channel then
acts on a single-mode quadrature X˜i in the beam B so
that it becomes
√
T (X˜i +XN ) +
√
1− TX0, where XN
is the excess noise quadrature, having variance ǫ, and
X0 is the multimode vacuum quadrature with variance
1, which is effectively coupled to the noisy signal on a
beam-splitter T . A similar transformation follows then
for the joint quadrature (1), measured by the multimode
homodyne detector by the remote trusted party (Bob).
In our work we waive the traditional assumption of the
single-mode character of the signal. However, to be able
to study the security of CV QKD in the multimode case
and to clearly observe the multimode effects in CV QKD
we state the following more detailed and thus weaker as-
sumptions, which are related to the details of the multi-
mode devices and which will be waived in further studies:
1. No cross-talk is assumed between the modes, which
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Scheme of the multimode
entanglement-based CV QKD with Gaussian entangled mul-
timode source. The multimode beams emitted by the source
are measured by two trusted parties Alice and Bob after the
untrusted lossy and noisy channel. The channel is under con-
trol of an eavesdropper and is parametrized by transmittance
T and excess noise ǫ. Measurement is modeled as performed
by the single-mode homodyne detectors (H) precessed by the
linear-optical modes coupling (LOC) and resulting in out-
comes of the form (1). (a) Untrusted homodyne scenario,
corresponding to the leakage of the auxiliary modes to the
environment, where they can be potentially measured by an
eavesdropper. (b) Trusted homodyne scenario, where aux-
iliary mode outputs of the LOC are discarded within the
trusted stations.
are supposed to be statistically independent.
2. No mode mismatch is assumed at the multimode
homodyne detection, i.e., all the modes are de-
tected on both the detectors.
3. The signal modes are assumed to be in phase with
the respective local oscillator modes. In case this
assumption does not hold, the additional detection
noise would be present.
4. The channel is assumed to be the same for all the
modes.
5. The multimode structure of the sources, channels,
and detectors is completely known to Eve, but only
the untrusted part of the setup can be manipulated
by her. This is a typical assumption made in CV
QKD.
The major point in the analysis of the multimode effects
is the awareness of the trusted parties of the detection
structure. If the trusted parties are unaware of the men-
tioned structure, all the residual modes in the multimode
homodyne detection become attributed to Eve and con-
tribute to her information on the key. If the trusted par-
ties however know at least partially the detection struc-
ture, they can put a tighter bound on Eve’s information.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security analysis of the QKD protocols is generally
based on the Csiszar-Korner theorem [45], from which
follows that the secure key can be distilled from the clas-
sical information shared between the trusted parties if
this information exceeds the information, available to a
potential eavesdropper on the data possessed by either of
the two trusted parties [3]. Thus, the security is estab-
lished as the positivity of the lower bound on the secure
key rate, which is the difference between the mutual in-
formation shared between the trusted parties, Alice and
Bob, and the upper bound on the information, available
to a potential eavesdropper, Eve. In the context of Gaus-
sian CV QKD protocols the upper bound on Eve’s infor-
mation can be estimated depending on a particular class
of attacks which Eve is assumed to be capable of. In the
simpler case Eve is supposed to be able to individually
measure her ancillary states coupled to the signal states,
which is referred to as individual attacks. In the more
general case of collective attacks it is assumed that Eve
can store her ancillary states in a quantum memory and
perform an optimized collective measurement on the set
of states after the measurement bases are revealed by Al-
ice and Bob. It was also recently shown that collective
attacks are no less effective than the most general coher-
ent attacks [46, 47], which is also valid for continuous-
variable protocols in the asymptotic regime [48]. Thus,
we establish security against the individual attacks to an-
alytically estimate the region where security is lost, since
insecurity against individual attacks is a sufficient condi-
tion for insecurity of the protocol against more sophisti-
cated attacks such as collective and coherent attacks. Al-
ternatively we analyze security against collective attacks
to estimate the region of parameters where the protocol
is asymptotically secure against any type of attack.
Mutual information shared between the trusted par-
ties is estimated as Shannon (classical) mutual informa-
tion. In the case when classical data possessed by the
trusted parties is Gaussian distributed, the mutual in-
formation is defined by variances and conditional vari-
ances of the measurement outcomes and can be written
as IAB = (1/2) log2 (VA/VA|B), where VA is the variance
of the data measured by the multimode homodyne detec-
tor at Alice and VA|B = VA−C2AB/VB is the conditional
variance of data measured at Alice on the measurement
outcomes of multimode homodyne detection at Bob, de-
fined through the correlation CAB between the measured
data and the variance VB of the data measured at Bob.
The explicit expressions for mutual information are given
in the particular cases below.
On the other hand, the estimation of Eve’s knowledge
on the measurement results of the trusted parties de-
pends on the assumptions on the type of attack Eve is
capable of and also on the knowledge the trusted par-
ties have on the detection structure. We further distin-
guish the two cases: when the trusted parties are un-
aware of the detection structure and thus cannot distin-
4guish whether the noise concerned with the detection is
trusted (we refer to such a case as the untrusted detec-
tion); and when the trusted parties know the detection
structure and are able to distinguish between the trusted
detection noise and untrusted channel noise (further re-
ferred to as the trusted detection).
Untrusted homodyne detectors. For standard CV ex-
periment with mode-insensitive multimode homodyne
detectors and sources feeding these detectors by quantum
multimode states, the trusted parties would typically not
be able to recognize that the experiment actually deals
with the multimode light. If the multimode detectors
are untrusted, all the negative impact of multimode ef-
fects is attributed to the channel, i.e., Eve is capable of
measuring the auxiliary modes leaving the linear-optical
couplers [see Fig. 1 (a)]. This case is equivalent to the un-
trusted preparation of a two-mode state, measured by the
trusted parties, i.e., the entangled source is untrusted as
well. In this case the channel becomes effectively present
in both the beams of the entangled states and the proto-
col combines features of direct and reverse reconciliation
schemes [14], similarly to the case, when the source is
placed in the middle of the channel [49]. Let us consider
this case in detail for both the individual and collective
attacks.
Security limitations. We first study the case of the
individual attacks which allows us to analytically iden-
tify the cases when the multimode CV QKD becomes
insecure. The information, which is leaking and is thus
potentially available to an eavesdropper Eve on the mea-
surement results of the receiver trusted party Bob, in the
case of individual attacks, is also given by the classical
mutual information between the respective data, thus the
lower bound on the key rate reads
Ki = IAB − IBE , (2)
where IBE = (1/2) log2 (VB/VB|E) and VB|E is the vari-
ance of the data measured by the remote trusted side
(Bob) conditioned on the measurement outcomes of an
eavesdropper (Eve).
The estimation of the second part of the lower bound
(2), in particular, of conditional variance VB|E requires
taking into account all the modes, which can be accessed
by an eavesdropper for the measurement (i.e., all the
untrusted modes). In the case of multimode detection
this can be different depending on the knowledge of the
trusted parties on the structure of their measurement.
In the following we analyze security assuming two main
scenariosof the untrusted and trusted multimode homo-
dyne detection. Note that mutual information IAB does
not depend on whether we use a trusted or an untrusted
detection model.
If the trusted parties are unaware of the multimode
homodyne detection structure and only possess the data
on the output in the form (1), the security analysis of
the multimode CV QKD must take into account that
the auxiliary output modes of the LOC are untrusted,
i.e., available to an eavesdropper.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Multimode CV QKD scheme with a
single-mode source V and N-mode detection in the general
case (a) and the equivalent scheme in the case of balanced
multimode detection (b). The particular case of the purely
lossy channel (i.e., the excess noise ǫ = 0) is considered.
To clearly demonstrate the multimode effect in the
simplest case we first establish security bounds on the
multimode protocol for the case of the individual attacks
assuming that the channel is purely lossy, i.e., the chan-
nel excess noise ǫ = 0. Such a channel can be modeled as
signal coupling to vacuum modes so that the eavesdrop-
per can measure the respective output modes E1...N after
the interaction. Moreover, if the multimode detection is
untrusted, then the auxiliary output modes of the LOC
interaction A2...N and B2...N on Alice and Bob trusted
sides respectively (with no loss of generality we assume
that mode with index 1 is measured on the output of
LOC) are accessible to Eve. The conditional variance
VB|E then becomes VB1|E1...NA2...NB2...N .
Let us first consider the case when the source emits in
a single mode, while the multimode detectors are mea-
suringN modes so thatN−1 additional modes measured
by the detectors are in the vacuum state, as depicted in
Fig. 2 (a). In this case the multimode detection scheme
becomes equivalent to coupling of a signal to vacuum
with ratio λ21 = 1/N [see Fig. 2 (b)]. Such additional
loss if it is attributed to the channel becomes equivalent
to a side-channel leakage from both the entangled beams
and may lead to a security break as well as to the reduc-
tion of entanglement shared between the trusted parties.
The mutual information in the case when all N detected
modes but one are in the vacuum state reads
IAB =
1
2
log2
N + T (V − 1)
T (N−2)(V−1)
N+V−1 +N
(3)
In the case of the untrusted detection, the modes A2, B2
after coupling are available to an eavesdropper, so the
conditional variance becomes VB|E = VB|EA2B2 , where
mode B is measured by Bob and mode E stands for the
output of the purely attenuating channel (beamsplitter
T). The lower bound on the information available to an
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Multimode CV QKD scheme with two-
mode source and detection in the purification scheme, where
modes are coupled and then measured by a single-mode ho-
modyne detector.
eavesdropper then becomes
IBE =
= 12 log2
[
N + T (V − 1)]
[
T (N−2)(V−1)
N2(N+V−1) +
1
N
]
(4)
The key rate (2) then turns to zero for any T (even for
T = 1, i.e., the perfect untrusted channel) when N = 2,
i.e., the presence of one additional vacuum mode being
measured already breaks the security of the protocol.
This is in contrast to the single-mode protocols when
any pure channel loss can in principle be tolerated with
reverse reconciliation [14]. The security break is caused
by Eve capturing 50% of the signal on the side of Al-
ice, which cancels Alices advantage in knowledge of what
was sent to the main channel and measured by Bob. Note
that the security is lost although the Gaussian entangle-
ment is preserved for this case.
Now let us consider the case, when the source emits in
two modes with state variances V1 and V2 in modes 1 and
2 respectively and only these modes are measured by the
multimode detector. This is equivalent to mode coupling
on a beamsplitter with transmittance λ21 and measure-
ment by a single-mode homodyne detector on one of the
outputs (see Fig. 3). In this case the mutual information
between the trusted parties is given by
IAB =
1
2
log2
1
1−
T
(
λ2
1
√
V 2
1
−1+(1−λ2
1
)
√
V 2
2
−1
)
2
A[1+T (A−1)]
, (5)
where A ≡ λ21(V1 − V2) + V2. In the case of the pure
channel loss and the untrusted detection, the upper
bound on the leaking information is expressed through
VB = T [λ
2
1V1 + (1 − λ21)V2] + 1 − T and VB|E1E2A2B2 ,
which reads
VB|E1E2A2B2 =
1
1−
T
(
V2−1+λ21
[
2+V1−V2−2V1V2+2C1C2−2λ21(1−V1V2+C1C2)
])
λ2
1
V1+(1−λ21)V2
, (6)
whereE1,2 are the direct outputs of the purely lossy chan-
nels simulated by the beamsplitters (similarly to Fig. 2);
A2, B2 are the auxiliary output modes of the mode cou-
pling (see Fig. 3). From these expressions the security
bounds can be obtained in the case of the individual at-
tacks.
Applicability of the protocol. Now let us analyze the se-
curity against the most general attacks in order to show
if the multimode CV QKD is in principle possible. We
consider the case when a potential eavesdropper is capa-
ble of collective attacks (equivalent to coherent attacks in
the asymptotic regime), i.e., can store the ancillary states
after coupling to a signal in a quantum memory and mea-
sure them collectively. In this case the upper bound on
the information available to an eavesdropper on the mea-
surement outcomes of the remote trusted party is given
by the Holevo bound χBE , which is the capacity of a
bosonic channel between an eavesdropper and the refer-
ence side of the protocol (Bob in the case of the reverse
reconciliation). The lower bound on the key rate then
becomes
K = βIAB − χBE , (7)
where we also took into account the effect of the imper-
fect postprocessing (mainly error correction) of the data,
shared between the trusted parties, which is given by the
postprocessing efficiency β ∈ (0, 1). The particular value
of β depends on the algorithms, used for the data pro-
cessing, which also have different efficiencies depending
on the signal-to-noise ratio, thus in the following analysis
we check our results for typical values of β, which were
about 95% reached in the experiment with coherent-state
CV QKD protocol [50], but can be also increased with
the new effective error-correction codes [51].
The Holevo bound is given by the von Neumann (quan-
tum) entropies and in the case of the Gaussian dis-
tributed data reads χBE = S(γE)− S(γE|B), where S(·)
denotes the von Neumann entropy, γE is the covariance
matrix of a generally multimode Gaussian state avail-
able to an eavesdropper, and γE|B is the covariance ma-
trix of the state, which is available to an eavesdropper,
conditioned by the measurement outcomes of the remote
trusted party (Bob). The sufficiency of the covariance
matrix description follows from the extremality of the
Gaussian states [52] and the subsequent optimality of
the Gaussian collective attacks [53, 54].
The conditional covariance matrix after the measure-
6ment at the remote receiving party on mode B is calcu-
lated as
γE|B = γE − σEB[XγBX ]MPσTEB , (8)
where γE is the covariance matrix of the generally multi-
mode state which is available to an eavesdropper; γB
is the covariance matrix of the state of the mode B
prior to measurement; σEB is the correlation matrix
describing correlation between mode B and the state
given by covariance matrix γE ; the diagonal 2x2 ma-
trix X = Diag(1, 0) stands with no loss of generality for
the measurement of the X-quadrature in mode B; MP
denotes Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of a matrix.
The von Neumann entropy of a state given by an N -
mode covariance matrix γ is calculated from the sym-
plectic eigenvalues νi of the covariance matrix as
S(γ) =
N∑
i=1
G
(νi − 1
2
)
, (9)
where G[x] = (x+1) log2 (x+ 1)−x log2 x is the bosonic
entropic function [55].
In the general case, when the channel is noisy or mea-
surement is untrusted, the eavesdropper is assumed to be
able to fully control the noise, i.e., hold the purification
of the state, shared between the trusted parties. Then
S(γE) = S(γAB), where γAB is the covariance matrix of
the state shared between Alice and Bob. Also, after the
measurement in mode B the similar equivalence holds for
the conditional state: S(γE|B) = S(γA|B). When multi-
mode detection is untrusted, i.e., the trusted parties are
unaware of the multimode structure of the their detec-
tors and sources, only the two-mode matrix γAB is avail-
able for the security analysis and represents a pessimistic
(i.e., not tight) bound on the information, available to an
eavesdropper. For ideal arbitrary asymmetrical detector
and N independent entangled state injected to the detec-
tor, the covariance matrix γ
(N)
AB measured by Alice and
Bob, being both ”ignorant” about the multimode struc-
ture of the experiment, is equal to the weighted average
γ
(N)
AB =
N∑
i=1
λ2i γAB,i (10)
of the covariance matrices γAB,i of individual
modes. The covariance matrix γAB,i is de-
fined by γ
(m,n)
AB,i = 〈r(m)i r(n)i 〉 − 〈r(m)i 〉〈r(n)i 〉 with
ri := (XA,i, XB,i, PA,i, PB,i)
T [56]. Such and ”ignorant”
approach is typical in the case when multimode structure
is not taken into account. This approach may lead to the
security break in terms of the key rate (7) even for an
ideal channel (T = 1, ǫ = 0) and perfect postprocessing
(β = 1).
In particular, when only one additional vacuum mode
is present in the multimode detection (i.e., N =
2, see Fig. 2) and the noiseless channel is perfect
(T = 1), the mutual information becomes IAB =
(1/2) log2 [(V + 1)/2], while the Holevo bound in this
case is given by G[(ν − 1)/2, where ν =
√
(V + 1)/2,
which evidently leads to security break.
When the two-mode source and two-mode detection is
considered as given in Fig. 3, the covariance matrix of
the state, shared between the trusted parties, reads
γA1B1 =
(
[λ21(V1 − V2) + V2]I
√
T [λ21C1 + λ
2
2C2]σz√
T [λ21C1 + λ
2
2C2]σz {1 + T [V2 + λ21(V1 − V2)− 1]}I
)
, (11)
where C1,2 ≡
√
V 21,2 − 1, I = Diag(1, 1) and σz =
Diag(1,−1). Similarly, the matrix of the uncorrelated
two-mode output of the purely attenuating channel
γE1E2 =
(
V1(1− T ) + T 0
0 V2(1− T ) + T
)
. (12)
The correlation matrix between the modes A1, B1 and
E1, E2 reads
σ(A1B1),(E1E2) =
= −
( √
λ21(1 − T )C1σz
√
λ21T (1− T )C1σz√
λ22(1 − T )C2σz
√
λ22(1− T )TC2σz
)
. (13)
The matrix of the auxiliary outputs of the LOC, modes
A2, B2, which are available to the eavesdropper in the un-
trusted scenario, is the same as the matrix γA1B1 up to
the substitution V1 → V2 and vice versa. Finally, the cor-
relation matrix σ(A1B1),(A2B2) between the trusted and
untrusted modes of the two-mode homodyne detection
reads
σ(A1B1),(A2B2) =
=
(
λ1λ2(V2 − V1)I λ1λ2
√
T (C2 − C1)σz
λ1λ2
√
T (C2 − C1)σz Tλ1λ2(V2 − V1)I
)
.(14)
The results for the N unoccupied auxiliary modes can
be obtained from the covariance matrices given above by
setting V2 = 1 and λ
2
1 = 1/N .
IV. WAYS TO IMPROVE SECURITY
Trusted homodyne detectors. If we know, at least a
7posteriori, the exact structure of multimode homodyne
detectors, multimode sources, and a channel, we can go
beyond the ”ignorant” untrusted approach and poten-
tially enhance the security. We therefore consider the
linear optical emulation (LOC) of the multimode detec-
tor as the purification of the otherwise ideal multimode
detectors and consider un-measured outputs as trusted,
i.e., not being accessible by Eve. This enables us to de-
rive a tighter bound on Eve’s information and increases
the lower bound on the secure key rate thus improving
the security of CV QKD. Note that the detectors must
be in this case characterized independently of the proto-
col run since the parameters of the detection would be
otherwise indistinguishable from the channel properties.
A similar approach to the trusted detector characteriza-
tion is used in the single-mode CV QKD [17, 50]. In the
multimode case the detectors must be calibrated apart of
the protocol using a known and controllable multimode
source (studied with a multimode measurement [25–30])
that allows obtaining the parameters of the LOC of the
given multimode detector.
However, the multimode influence in the case of the
trusted homodyne detection becomes equivalent to the
trusted preparation noise [18, 19] and trusted detection
noise [17] for a single-mode protocol. This may still lead
to security break, when auxiliary modes are not occupied.
The effect of trusted detection can be observed already
in the case of individual attacks. The conditional vari-
ance in this case is obtained only from VB|E as an eaves-
dropper could not benefit from the measurement of the
auxiliary modes. The second part of the key rate then
reads
IBE =
1
2
log2
[N + T (V − 1)][T (V − 1)− V ]
T (N − 1)(V − 1)−NV , (15)
and the protocol becomes secure for N = 2 at any chan-
nel transmittance and is secure upon any N when the
channel is perfect (at least in the case of individual at-
tacks; the collective attacks are considered below). How-
ever, the security break may still occur. In particular,
the security bound is given by
1
N
=
(1− T )(V − 1)
3V − 2T (V − 1)− 1 , (16)
from which follows that for strongly attenuating channel
T → 0 the bound becomes 1/N = (V − 1)/(3V − 1) and
for V → ∞ the security break is observed when more
than two additional vacuum modes are measured by the
multimode homodyne detector. In the case of collective
attacks the purification involves not only the modes A1
and B1, which are detected after LOC, but also all the
auxiliary outputs of LOC, i.e., the equations S(γE) =
S(γA1...ANB1...BN ) and S(γE|B) = S(γA1...ANB2...BN |B1)
hold. For the previously discussed basic two-mode sce-
nario with one unoccupied mode we reach no security
break when detection is balanced. In particular, for the
arbitrarily strong variance of the main signal V1 → ∞
FIG. 4: (Color online) Lower bound on secure key rate in the
case of collective attacks versus distance in fiber with stan-
dard attenuation -0.2 dB/km for multimode entanglement-
based CV QKD with two-mode states upon trusted, given in
green (dark gray), and untrusted, given in orange (light gray),
homodyne detection at V1 = 3. λ
2
1 = 0.5 and V2 = 1 (dot-
ted lines), λ21 = 0.5 and V2 = 1.1 (dashed lines), λ
2
1 = 0.95
and V2 = 1 (solid lines). Black solid thick line represents the
benchmark set by single-mode CV QKD protocol with source
variance V = 3. In all the cases channel noise is ǫ = 5% SNU
and postprocessing efficiency β = 95%.
the secure key rate in the case of collective attacks reads
K(2) = 12 log2 [(1− T/2)/(1− T )], which is lower than
the similar key rate in the single-mode case K(1) =
log2 [1/(1− T )], but in contrast to the untrusted case
remains positive at any non-zero channel transmittance
T. The improvement from trusted consideration of the
multimode homodyne detectors can be also seen from
the Fig. 4. It shows the key rate upon the presence of
additional unoccupied mode and trusted homodyne de-
tector (green dotted line), which is non-zero contrary to
the untrusted case, when security was lost already for
a perfect channel. Here and further in our analysis we
fix the channel noise to 5% of the shot-noise unit (SNU)
which well complies with the long-distance realization of
coherent-state CV QKD [16], where the channel noise of
up to 1% SNU was observed.
Unbalanced multimode sources. Contrary to the case,
when the auxiliary modes are not occupied, the source
may emit in all or some of the modes measured by the
multimode detector. The presence of the less occupied
modes with the lower variance still limits security of CV
QKD, as seen from Fig. 5, which is further enforced by
the presence of the channel noise. Evidently, the un-
trusted homodyne detection scenario is more sensitive
to the unbalancing of the source. In particular, in the
case of individual attacks and arbitrarily strong vari-
ance of the main mode V1 → ∞ the security break is
observed independently of channel transmittance at any
V2 < 1 − λ21 + 1/(4 − 4λ21) if λ21 ∈ (0, 0.5), when the ho-
modyne detection is untrusted. The negative impact of
the unbalancing of the source is also visible in Fig. 4 in
both the trusted and untrusted regimes. However, even
the weak signal in the auxiliary mode can still improve
8robustness of the protocol; see Fig. 4 (dashed lines).
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Security region against collective at-
tacks for the two-mode CV QKD in terms of mode variances
V1 and V2 in case of untrusted (left) and trusted (right) mul-
timode homodyne detection. In both the cases channel noise
ǫ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5% SNU (lines from left to right) is present,
mode coupling in detection is balanced. Channel transmit-
tance T = 3 · 10−2, postprocessing is perfect (β = 1). The
area of parameters above each of the lines is secure upon given
conditions.
Mode selection in the homodyne detector. If the
weighting in the detector enforces the mode with low
correlation in the source, the impact on the resulting key
rate is negative, as mentioned above, thus the security
of the scheme is reduced. However, if the detection is
mode-selective towards the modes with the high corre-
lation in the source, the resulting key rate and security
of the protocol can be restored. In the limiting case the
proper detection can completely cancel the noisy uncor-
related modes. If the mode selection is imperfect, then
it still limits the security region of the protocol, but the
improvement can be significant, which is seen from Fig.
4 (solid lines).
Partial knowledge of the detection structure. It is also
possible that the trusted parties possess only limited
knowledge of the detection and source multimode struc-
ture, i.e., they can only partly purify the covariance ma-
trix obtained from their measurement. Indeed, if the
trusted parties are able to discriminate between some of
the modes in the multimode detection, but are still un-
aware about the whole structure, the security bound is
improved compared to a completely ”ignorant” approach,
but is still reduced compared to the complete knowledge
of the setup structure. Moreover, the effective parame-
ters of the untrusted channel can be recalculated depend-
ing on the ability of the trusted parties to discriminate
between the modes and learn their structure. The ex-
ample of the impact of partial knowledge of the trusted
parties on the parameters of the setup is given in Table I,
where different parametrizations of the channel leading
to the same two-mode covariance matrix γAB measured
by the multimode homodyne detectors are given depend-
ing on how much information on the source and detection
structure trusted parties have.
3-mode 2-mode 1-mode
(reality) (limited knowledge) (”ignorant” approach)
V1 = 5, λ
2
1 = 95% V
(2)
1 = 5, λ
2
1 = 95%
Setup parameters V2 = 1.5, λ
2
2 = 2.5% V
(2)
2 = 1.3, λ
2
2 = 5% V
(1)
1 = 4.815
V3 = 1.1, λ
2
3 = 2.5%
Channel parameters T T (2) ≈ 0.999T T (1) ≈ 0.993T
ǫ = 0.05 ǫ(2) ≈ 0.0535 ǫ(1) ≈ 0.0773
TABLE I: Effective parameters of the channel depending on the knowledge of trusted parties on the multimode structure of
source and detectors.
It is evident from the table, that as trusted parties have
less information about the mode structure, the effective
channel noise, which is present in the covariance matrix
they measured, increases. This leads to the reduction of
the lower bound on the key rate and to the limited ap-
plicability of the protocol, as illustrated in Fig. 6. Thus,
the ”ignorant” approach to the multimode detection may
still provide security of CV QKD, but in the very limited
range compared to the case, when the structure of the
source and detectors is known and taken into account
in the security analysis of the CV QKD protocols. The
example given above illustrates the importance of knowl-
edge of the mode structure.
Symmetrization of the source modes. In the case when
the trusted parties are able to control the variance of the
individual modes in the source, they can make it more
balanced, which brings the untrusted homodyne detec-
tion scenario closer to the trusted one. If the source bal-
ancing is perfect, the single-mode scenario can be recov-
ered. From (13) it is easy to see already for the two-mode
case that if the source is perfectly balanced, i.e., V1 = V2,
then σ(A1B1),(A2B2) = 0. This means that the correlation
between the trusted modes and the untrusted outputs
of the detection completely vanishes. In this regime the
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FIG. 6: Lower bound on secure key rate in the case of col-
lective attacks versus distance in fiber with standard attenua-
tion -0.2 dB/km for multimode entanglement-based CV QKD
upon three different situations given in Table I: 3-mode (solid
line), 2-mode (dashed line), and 1-mode (dotted line); the
postprocessing efficiency is β = 95%.
protocol becomes equivalent to the single-mode CV QKD
protocol. Such positive effect of the source balancing is
valid for any number of the modes. The multimode struc-
ture in this case effectively vanishes due to the averaging
of the covariance matrix, which becomes fully equivalent
to the single-mode one. Moreover, the energy leakage
from the auxiliary modes of the homodyne detector stops
in this case since their respective correlations with the
signal modes are canceled out. In this case the difference
between the trusted and untrusted homodyne detection
vanishes, as can be seen from Fig. 5, where contour lines
are crossing the diagonal in the same points at both the
left and right plots. The effect is similar to vanishing of
information leakage from the lossy channel by state en-
gineering [22] or to entanglement-induced transparency
[57, 58].
Security stabilization. Still, if the source is nearly bal-
anced, but the asymmetries in the mode energy remain
present, the key rate would be reduced. Surprisingly,
such asymmetries or energy fluctuations per mode of the
source have a less pronounced effect on the security of
CV QKD when the number of modes is increased; this
can be seen in Fig. 7. Our result constitutes the deter-
ministic method of stabilization of the secure key rate,
when errors are suppressed due to the joint homodyne
detection of the many modes, used to encode informa-
tion. The result opens a promising pathway towards CV
QKD with the heavily multimode sources even upon en-
ergy fluctuations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We suggest the CV QKD protocol using the multimode
entangled states and homodyne detection. We show that
multimode quantum key distribution with homodyne de-
tection is more feasible if the multimode structure is sym-
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Numerical simulation of lower bound
on the secure key rate in case of collective attacks for multi-
mode CV QKD with varying mode variance V ∼ N(3, 0.75)
for number of modes N = 5 (light gray) and N = 100 (black)
versus the time flow of the protocol runs. The single-mode
CV QKD key rate for constant source variance V = 3 is given
in blue (dark gray) dashed line for the reference. In all the
cases channel transmittance T = 3 · 10−2 (corresponding to
approximately 76 km of telecom fiber), channel noise ǫ = 5%
SNU and postprocessing efficiency β = 95%.
metrically engineered. If the modes are unbalanced, we
can expand the security region of the protocol by taking
into account the mode structure of the source. More-
over, we suggest the direct application of multimode en-
tanglement generation and detection, as more modes of
the key distribution stabilize fluctuations of the secure
key rate. This result is in contrast to previous research,
when the multimode character of quantum communica-
tion has been ignored or considered as negative. It mo-
tivates a search for the multimode quantum information
protocols where multimode structure is not limiting and
even brings a positive effect. The result opens a path-
way towards the experimental investigation and practical
application of the multimode bright entangled states in
quantum communication.
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